Background
As a modern political historian looking back at Jiangdong between 195 and 200, Sun Ce's pacification campaign was at once a military conquest and a political reconstruction. After Sun Jian died in battle, his old troops scattered under Yuan Shu's command, and Sun Ce himself was subordinated to Yuan Shu for several years — marginalized and little utilized. At that time Jiangdong was neither a unified region nor a truly impregnable stronghold: Liu Yao held Qua with the official title of Yangzhou Governor, Yan Baihu occupied Wu Commandery, Wang Lang held Huiji as commandery administrator, and Hua Xin controlled Yuzhang — each holding his own territory but unable to coordinate with the others. Mountain Yue peoples were active throughout, and the shi-clan families sat on the fence. Sun Ce's choice to borrow troops from Yuan Shu in the north and march south to fight in Jiangdong was in essence the founding of a new regime in a land without a master.
Key Figures
The most critical figures on this stage. Sun Ce himself was the nucleus of both politics and military command. Zhou Yu joined him at Liyang, bringing strategists Zhu Zhi and Lv Fan into the team and recommending Zhang Zhao and Zhang Hong to form the "Two Zhangs" inner staff [c:16754]. Zhang Zhao managed internal affairs while Zhang Hong handled diplomatic correspondence — this division of inner and outer responsibilities was already taking shape in Sun Ce's era, laying the groundwork for Sun Quan's later elaboration. The veteran generals of his father's generation — Cheng Pu, Huang Gai, and Han Dang — formed the military backbone. Wu Jing, Sun Ce's maternal uncle, provided supplies and logistical support from Danyang. Among the local shi-clan elite, Zhu Zhi and Yu Fan represented the local talent absorbed into the new regime. This three-layer structure of "father's veteran followers + local elite + new-generation strategists" was the key to Sun Ce's ability to integrate Jiangdong within five years.
Core Issues
Pacifying Jiangdong actually required resolving three deeper problems. The first is legitimacy: Sun Ce borrowed troops from Yuan Shu under the pretext of "avenging the wrongs done to his maternal uncle Wu Jing," pledging the imperial jade seal as collateral [c:16754] — this was both a practical arrangement for obtaining troops and a political preparation for breaking away from the Yuan Shu nexus. Once Jiangdong was pacified, the seal remained in Yuan Shu's hands, but real authority had transferred to Sun Ce. The second is military-political integration: Sun Ce's military victories came quickly, but the Jiangdong aristocracy was by nature wary of northern military men; he used Zhou Yu to introduce Zhang Zhao and Zhang Hong, and personally made courtesy calls to recruit reclusive shi-clan scholars, converting military conquest into political absorption and allowing Jiangdong's great families to accept the new order as their initial hostility subsided. The third is the relationship with the north: before Cao Cao and Yuan Shao had determined the victor, Sun Ce occupied a position of "respected marginality"; through such moves as having Zhang Hong present a memorial to Xudou and requesting the title of Grand Marshal, he continually tested the northern response. Cao Cao's answer was a mixture of alliance (a daughter of Cao Ren married Sun Kuang) and constraint (withholding the Grand Marshal title) — this delicate balance gave Sun Ce the window he needed to build an independent regime.
Political Consequences
The political consequences of Sun Ce's pacification of Jiangdong were immediate and structural. First, the six commanderies of Jiangdong (Wu, Huiji, Danyang, Yuzhang, Lujiang, and Luling) came under unified Sun command, ending the former pattern of fragmented rule under Liu Yao, Wang Lang, and Yan Baihu. Second, the newly established council structure — Cheng Pu, Huang Gai, and Han Dang commanding the armies; Zhang Zhao, Zhang Hong, and Zhou Yu advising on policy; Zhu Zhi and Yu Fan integrating local affairs — provided the human foundation for the Eastern Wu regime, and this same core group remained central at the time of the Battle of Chibi. Third, the 199 seizure of Lujiang and defeat of Liu Xun extended Jiangdong northward to the Hefei front, bringing it into direct territorial contact with Cao Cao's sphere — adding both strategic opportunity and the risk of direct confrontation, forming the material basis for Sun Ce's late-career ambition to strike toward Xudou. Fourth, Sun Ce's hegemony left Sun Quan a complete "proto-state" to inherit, such that upon taking the throne Sun Quan needed only minor political and diplomatic adjustments.
Counterfactual Analysis
Suppose Sun Ce had not received Zhou Yu's timely support at Liyang, or had not had the Zhang Zhao–Zhang Hong staff at his side. Even had he been able to defeat Liu Yao and Yan Baihu militarily, the backlash from the Jiangdong aristocracy would have rapidly mired the regime in difficulties, and dying far from home — like his father Sun Jian — would have been the likely outcome. Alternatively, suppose Yuan Shu had seen through Sun Ce's intentions and withheld the jade seal or detained Sun Ce himself — Jiangdong history would have been entirely different. But Yuan Shu was shortsighted and greedy for the seal, and in so doing inadvertently made Sun Ce's success possible. Viewed from a broader perspective, Sun Ce's success in pacifying Jiangdong lay in his refusal to treat the enterprise as a purely military expedition. He treated it instead as a systematic "political transplant" — from an exile force dependent on Yuan Shu, to an independently established Jiangdong regime. This comprehensive transformation from the military to the political plane is the fundamental basis on which posterity has assessed Sun Ce as "the founder of Eastern Wu."