Origins
Sima Shi's deposition of Emperor Cao Fang and installation of Cao Mao in the sixth year of Jiaping (254) pushed the central politics of Wei into a state profoundly hostile to the old guard. The first year of Zhengyuan's act of deposition, particularly the execution of Li Feng, Xiahou Xuan, and others, had cleared the court of those still sympathetic to the Cao founding line quite thoroughly. Among the outer garrisons, Guanqiu Jian had long commanded the southeast and had twice campaigned against Goguryeo — one of the few surviving senior ministers who still commanded independent military force; Wen Qin garrisoned Yangzhou and was equally at odds with Simashi. In the first month of the following year the two men conspired to raise troops in Shouchun, presenting themselves under the rubric of "acting on the Empress Dowager's edict" to attack Sima Shi [c:17145] [c:17146]. The timing of the uprising reflected a calculation: if they waited any longer, Sima Shi would completely foreclose the space for a frontier backlash.
Participants
The rebel side's main strength came from fifty to sixty thousand troops from the Huainan and Yangzhou garrisons. They also sent four sons as hostages to Eastern Wu in a bid for external support. Sun Jun at one point led Wu forces across the Yangtze northward to raid Shouchun, giving the rebel side the design of "simultaneous inner and outer assault." The suppression side fielded the complete roster of Wei's later-period military system: Sima Shi led the campaign in person, with Fu Gu, Wang Ji, Hu Zun, Deng Ai, and Zhuge Dan participating in sequence — mobilizing virtually all of Wei's first-line commanders for this battle [c:17147] [c:17148]. In terms of political symbolism, this battle was in substance the last large-scale confrontation between the "Caowei regional faction" and the "Simashi central faction."
Decisive Turn
Fu Gu advised Sima Shi to adopt the strategy of "deep trenches and high ramparts, refusing to engage lightly" [c:17147], aiming to exhaust the fighting edge of the Huainan forces who had come from a distance. Wang Ji in turn proposed seizing the key position of Nandun before the enemy could occupy it, rapidly tilting strategic initiative toward the Wei side [c:17147]. Guanqiu Jian, facing the immovable fortifications of Sima Shi's main force while also hearing news that Sun Jun had crossed the Yangtze to raid Shouchun and fearing his rear would fall, was compelled to withdraw to Xiangcheng [c:17148] — this withdrawal completely dissolved the rebel side's offensive posture. Immediately after, Sima Shi adopted the "three-pronged strike" proposal: Deng Ai to take Lejia, Wang Ji to take Xiangcheng, Zhuge Dan to take Shouchun, boxing the rebel side into a dead-end of cut supplies and blocked retreat routes within less than ten days. Wen Qin and his son attempted a night assault on Lejia, and Wen Yang charged in and out alone, leaving behind a personal legend — but strategically this changed nothing about the course of the battle [c:17149].
Suppression and Outcome
In the intercalary first month, Wen Qin was defeated at Lejia and fled to Shouchun, only to find that Zhuge Dan had already occupied it; hemmed in by Hu Zun, Wang Ji, and Deng Ai, he finally had nowhere to turn and surrendered to Wu's Sun Jun [c:17150]. Guanqiu Jian slipped out of Xiangcheng by night and was killed by a local inhabitant en route in Shen County; his head was sent to the capital [c:17145]. After the battle the Wei court offered amnesty to Huainan subjects who had been caught up in the uprising, appointed Zhuge Dan as Grand General of the East, and before long Sima Shi died of illness in Xu Chang. Sima Zhao took over as Grand General and Recorder of Affairs, completing the critical step in the hereditary transfer of Simashi power. This chain of political consequences demonstrates that the battle was not merely a military victory — it was the turning point at which Simashi's hereditary monopoly on central military authority became institutionalized.
Historical Legacy
This rebellion carried multiple long-term meanings. First, it thoroughly suppressed the inclination of the southeastern frontier commanders to resist the center; Zhuge Dan's subsequent rebellion, though larger in scale, was already a last desperate throw of the dice. Second, it left in the literary tradition the legendary figure of Wen Yang: the "single-handedly charging in and out seven times" in chapter 110 of the novel became a progenitor-motif for later narratives of martial valor. Third, from the perspective of the Weijinchandai, this battle accomplished the clearing of the ground for Simashi to complete the generational handoff "from Shi to Zhao" — without this clearing, Sima Zhao's path to replacing Wei could not have been completed within a decade or so. From a wider vantage point, the Wuqiujianwenqinzhiluan reflects a common pattern: once the tension between centralized authority and frontier autonomy tips out of balance, the "legitimizing packaging" of "rising under a secret imperial edict" that frontier commanders adopt is nearly guaranteed to fail when the new center has already completed its control of the palace script — the true outcome of a rebellion is decided before the first battle, in the phase of political preparation.