Background
The fundamental context of Liubeijihuangdiwei — Liu Bei's enthronement as emperor — was the "vacuum in Han dynastic legitimacy." In the first month of the twenty-fifth year of Jian'an (220), Cao Cao died at Luoyang; Cao Pi succeeded as King of Wei. In the tenth month of the same year Cao Pi accepted the abdication of Emperor Xian, abolished the Han and founded Wei, and Emperor Xian was demoted to the Duke of Shanyang. This act formally terminated the four-hundred-year succession of the two Han dynasties. Political intelligence channels in the Shu region also transmitted the mistaken report that "Emperor Xian had already been murdered," turning the "vacancy of the Han throne" from a legal gap into a factual one. Liu Bei — a lord who had taken his political legitimacy from his identity as "a kinsman of the Han imperial house," invoking his descent from King Jing of Zhongshan from the very moment he raised troops at Zhuojun — was the most natural person to fill this vacancy. From the perspective of institutional history, Caopidaihan — Cao Pi's replacement of Han — was the first "abdication-style" dynastic transition since the Western Han; Liubeichengdi — Liu Bei's proclamation of emperorship — was the most direct counter-move: opposing "bloodline legitimacy" to "transfer of the Mandate of Heaven," and redefining the source of political authority.
Key Figures
The true architect of the enthronement arrangement was Zhuge Liang. The ritual procedure of three refusals and three urgings, the coordinated political pressure of collective memorials from civil and military officials, and the ceremonial specifications overseen by the Court Academicians and Remonstrance Advisers — all reflect Zhuge Liang's thorough mastery of Han abdication and enthronement ritual. Xu Jing, as a distinguished scholar of the former Han, a veteran official of the Eastern Han, and a "cross-dynasty opinion leader" who had fled turmoil and taken refuge in Shu, was the most important resource through which Liu Bei could speak to the literati of the Central Plains — his participation in urging enthronement gave Liu Bei's proclamation the coloring of "universal recognition by the Confucian establishment," rather than merely a local warlord's self-appointment. Mi Zhu, as one of Liu Bei's earliest patrons, and Zhang Fei, as a founding brother of the Peach Garden oath, represented the "old guard's personal loyalty" — their participation in the urging showed that the original core had no objections whatsoever. Liu Chan was installed as Crown Prince, locking in the next step of power transfer simultaneously and avoiding a succession struggle of the Caowei type. The overall power configuration was clear: Zhuge Liang governing, Xu Jing presiding over ritual, Liu Chan bearing the succession, and the founding veterans serving as the foundation.
Core Issues
On the surface the issue was "whether or not to proclaim emperorship"; at a deeper level it was "on what legitimacy narrative to found Shuhan." Cao Pi followed the path of "transfer of the Mandate of Heaven, the Han dynasty's fate having run its course," acknowledging that the Han's mandate was exhausted and Wei was its successor; had Liu Bei also followed this path, his difference from Cao Pi would have amounted to nothing more than a difference in strength, and Shuhan's existence would have had no independent moral standing. The path Zhuge Liang chose was "the Han house has not perished — a scion of the bloodline continues the succession" — since Emperor Xian had been deposed, the Han imperial line continued through Liu Bei's branch; Shuhan was not a new dynasty but the Han dynasty in continuity. This choice produced three fundamental consequences: first, the dynastic title was fixed as "Han" rather than any new name, and the era name "Zhangwu" echoed Emperor Guangwu's "Jianwu," embedding Shuhan within the narrative chain of Han revival; second, all military actions against Wei acquired the legitimacy of "suppressing rebellion rather than launching conquest" — the phrase "restore the Han house and return to the old capital" in the Shixiao Memorial is the concrete expression of this logic; third, the internal cohesion of the Shuhan regime was strengthened — the original-followers faction, the Jingzhou faction, the Eastern-province faction, and the Yizhou faction could all coexist under the greatest common denominator of "restoring the Han."
Political Consequences
The most immediate consequence was that the nominal structure of San Guo tripartition was completed at this moment: Cao Pi proclaimed himself emperor in 220, Liu Bei in 221, and Sunquanchengdi — Sun Quan — in 229 (the latest, since his claim to legitimacy was the thinnest). Shuhan became the only one of the three states to claim the identity of "continuation of the succession" — a positioning that required it to carry out continuous northern campaigns. Without them, "restoring the Han" would become an empty boast and the regime's legitimacy would erode from within. The medium-term consequence was the strategic disaster of the immediately following eastern campaign against Wu to avenge Guan Yu — the defeat at Yiling left Shuhan's field army nearly exhausted, Liu Bei himself died of illness at Baidi, and the "restore the Han" narrative suffered a major fracture in only the second year of the new state's existence. Zhao Yun's remonstrance — "the state's enemy is Cao Pi, not Sun Quan" — struck precisely at this wound. The long-term consequence was that Zhuge Liang and Jiang Wei in two successive generations of northern expeditions were all driven by "the promissory note of succession issued on the day of enthronement" — Shuhan's raison d'être was inextricably locked to the goal of "fighting back to the Central Plains," which was simultaneously its source of strength and its greatest burden.
Counterfactual Analysis
What if Liu Bei had refused to proclaim himself emperor and remained in Shu under the title of King of Hanzhong? One possibility is that Shuhan would have persisted as a "Han-loyalist entity that never proclaimed emperorship," but its legitimacy would have declined year by year — Cao Pi was already emperor, Sun Quan might proclaim himself at any moment, and without following suit Shuhan would have been reduced to a "second-tier entity" in Three Kingdoms diplomacy. A second possibility is that Liu Bei might have waited for Emperor Xian to actually die or for confirmed news before proclaiming himself emperor, further reinforcing the ceremonial justification — but the cost of waiting would have been missing the optimal window of "the moment after Caopidaihan, when hearts and minds had not yet settled." The most interesting counterfactual is this: if at the time of enthronement Shuhan had established its capital at Hanzhong rather than Chengdu, pushing the seat of power northward onto the axis of advance originally envisioned in the Longzhong plan, then northern campaigns would not merely be military operations but an extension of national policy binding "capital relocation" to "restoration." Zhuge Liang's later six sorties from Qishan might have shifted from "arduous expeditions from a great distance" to "deploying forces from close range," significantly improving Shuhan's strategic efficiency. Yet Chengdu's economic conditions and defensive depth made this option unworkable at the time — which itself illustrates that from the very day of enthronement, Shuhan bore an unbridgeable tension between the "narrative of succession" and geographic reality.