Background
This event is the direct political sequel to the parent event "Zhugekebeifaweixincheng." In the spring of 253 Zhuge Ke mobilized two hundred thousand troops to besiege Hefeixincheng, intending to ride the momentum of his great Dongxing victory and push Jiangdong's influence back into Huainan. Wei's tenacious defense combined with epidemic disease inside the Wu army caused losses of more than half within two to three months; by the eighth month of autumn he was forced to withdraw back to Wu. This catastrophe drained Zhuge Ke's political chips in the court, and pushed the Sun Jun– Teng Yin faction from latent opposition into active planning. Chen Shou in San Guozhi specifically emphasizes at this juncture that Sun Jun "capitalized on the widespread resentment of the people and the aversion of the multitude" to frame Zhuge Ke, signaling that this was a coup executed by "seizing a momentum already in motion."
Principal Figures
Sun Jun was the coup's planner and executor; the palace guard he commanded was the physical basis for taking action. Although the boy-emperor Sun Liang was barely twelve, he "conspired" with Sun Jun — a critically important word in the historical record — meaning the coup was not launched unilaterally by Sun Jun but that the imperial will was deliberately incorporated into its framework of legitimacy. Zhuge Ke at this point already showed signs of fatigue; the historical record notes that on the eve of the banquet he was mentally restless and unable to sleep through the night; the next day the water had a fishy stench, his clothing carried an unusual odor, and the gate dog twice seized his sleeve — all standard devices of classical historiography for "building suspense + hinting at fate." They may be genuine remembered details, or very likely embellishments added by later recorders to provide the coup with its portents. Zhang Yue, as one of Zhuge Ke's close attendants, was the critical failure point in the protective structure that day; Teng Yin was Sun Jun's ally and briefly benefited afterward.
Core Issues
This historical source concentrates three questions. The first is "the marginal cost of a power transfer": Zhuge Ke after returning in defeat from New City did not proactively yield authority but instead tightened his grip on the palace garrison and court affairs, transforming himself from "a chief minister who could be dismissed" into "a chief minister who had to be eliminated." The cost of the coup was therefore pushed to its limit. The second is "the emperor's position in a coup": Chen Shou's four characters "conspired with Liang" define this coup not as a pure imperial-clan seizure but as a purge action in which the emperor personally participated — a characterization that profoundly shaped later assessments of the legitimacy of Sun Jun's rule. The third is "the interweaving of historical writing and fate narrative": San Guozhi here exceptionally devotes a long passage to the ill omens Zhuge Ke encounters before the banquet, reflecting Chen Shou's morally complex attitude toward this coup — he acknowledges that it "answered popular resentment," yet uses the omens to hint at the protagonist's tragic destiny.
Political Consequences
After Zhuge Ke's execution his family was purged: his eldest son had died young, his second son Zhuge Song and youngest son Zhuge Jian were killed or fled abroad in the wake of the coup, dissolving within two generations the political family line that Zhuge Jin had built in Jiangdong. The deeper consequence was the replication of the pattern of "killing a chief minister at a banquet": over the next five years Sun Jun and Sun Lin continued to deploy the same method against political enemies, turning the Wu court into a stage for chain killings. Externally, Caowei's expectations of Wu's future offensive capacity dropped sharply; the Sima house was able to focus on handling Shuhan and the internal Huainan second revolt. From the perspective of the overall strategic picture, this coup indirectly bought time for the Sima house to stabilize the northern front.
Counterfactual Analysis
Had Zhuge Ke after returning in defeat from New City chosen to submit a formal memorial of apology and surrender part of his military-political authority, the rhetorical basis for Sun Jun's coup would have been greatly undermined; at most the outcome would have been "removed from office and sent home." Conversely, had Sun Jun's coup failed — for instance if Zhang Yue had noticed the hidden troops during the banquet in time — Zhuge Ke would very likely have turned around and purged the Sun Jun faction; but his military defeat remained unaddressed and a next coup attempt was only a matter of time. At a more macroscopic level, the political consequences of the New City defeat made Zhuge Ke's death almost structurally inevitable. The "sense of destiny" that the historical text renders through its portent style precisely maps this structural necessity — when a chief minister simultaneously loses battlefield victory, clan support, and court public opinion, he will not land safely regardless of what form his removal takes.